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Abstract: 
 
This paper investigates the link between immigration and property markets in 
England and Wales. Evidence from fixed effects and shift-share-based instrumental 
variable regressions suggests that an increase in regional immigration, depending on 
the specification, either decreases prices at the lower end of the distribution up to the 
median or leaves them unchanged and has (almost) no effect on mean property prices 
or prices above the median. The evidence suggests that these findings can be 
explained through an interaction between the markets for rented and owned 
properties as well as through changes in the usage of housing space. 
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Introduction 
This paper investigates the link between immigration and property prices in England 
and Wales with a specific focus on the usage of housing space and the interaction of 
the markets for rented and owned properties. This topic has received a lot of public 
attention in a range of countries, For example, in the UK the impact of immigration 
on housing markets (and the availability of properties and their prices more generally) 
has received considerable attention in the public and the media. Cases in point are the 
comment made by home secretary Theresa May that a net migration of zero would 
lead British house prices to fall by 10% over a 20 year period (Johnson, 2012) or the 
more recent debates surrounding the UK government’s “Help to buy” and “NewBuy” 
schemes introduced in the 2013 budget. I use census data from the 2001 and 2011 UK 
censuses combined with property price data from the UK Land Registry and account 
for the endogeneity of immigrants’ location choice by using a shift-share-instrument, 
where current immigration patterns are instrumented using historical immigration 
pattern. Evidence from fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions suggests 
that an increase in regional immigration (a) increases the number of available 
properties, (b) decreases the number of property transactions, (c) depending on the 
specification either decreases prices at the lower end of the distribution up to the 
median or leaves them unchanged and (d) has (almost) no effect on mean property 
prices or prices above the median. I also provide evidence on mechanisms that might 
help explain these effects: (e) Natives move out of regions as immigration increases, 
even though migration still leads to population increases, (f) the number of persons 
per room increases with the share of immigrants, i.e., existing properties become 
more crowded, (g) immigration decreases the share of owner-occupiers and increases 
the share of households renting from private landlords, but not the share of 
households in social housing and (h) there appears to be a shift from larger properties 
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towards medium-sized ones, which can be a sign that owners split up larger properties 
such as houses to offer them on the renting market. 
 
Much of the academic discussion on the impact of immigration has focused on 
wages. 1  In contrast, there is comparatively little evidence on whether and how 
immigration affects housing markets. Theoretically, an increase in (net) immigration 
into an area can go both ways: Firstly, immigration might increase the local 
population, which should increase the demand for housing and consequently property 
prices. Secondly, immigration might lead to an outflow of natives (see, e.g., Borjas, 
Freeman and Katz, 1997; Card, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Accetturo et al., 2014). This 
outflow might be to other areas within the same city and has been explained by 
immigration having an effect on natives’ amenities (Accetturo et al., 2014). If this is 
the case, immigration into an area might actually decrease the local population, 
leading potentially to a decrease in the demand for housing, although the impact on 
the city level is more ambiguous. Thirdly, natives and immigrants might differ in their 
usage of existing properties (see, e.g., Carter, 2005, for some evidence from Canada). 
If, for example, immigrants are willing to accept more crowded living conditions, 
more people can live in the same housing stock, which should mitigate a potential 
increase in demand. Fourthly, immigrants and natives might differ in their willingness 
to pay for housing of a certain quality. If, say, recent immigrants care less about the 
standard of a property, home-owners might be less willing to invest in refurbishments 
or renovations, which could lower prices through a decrease in the quality of the 
                                                        
1  See, e.g., the recent symposium in the Journal of the European Economic 
Association (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth, 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2012; 
Card, 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2012). 
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housing stock. Fifthly, the extent to which an increase in housing demand will affect 
prices will also depend on the reaction of housing supply: If supply is inelastic, 
increases in demand will have a stronger effect on property prices than in a situation 
where the supply of housing is elastic. Finally, the extent to which immigrants are 
looking to rent rather than buy a property will also have an impact on the demand for 
rented vs. owned accommodation – although these effects might matter less in the 
long run. 
 
Answering the question what impact immigration has on housing costs is important as 
it might represent an additional cost to natives (and earlier immigrants): Firstly, for 
households owning a property changes in property prices effectively represent 
changes in wealth, which might influence consumption (e.g., Disney, Gathergood and 
Hanley, 2010) or households’ willingness or ability to borrow and take on debt (e.g., 
Disney, Bridges and Gathergood, 2010). Secondly, falling house prices might 
influence labor mobility by adding an additional cost of moving, namely having to 
sell a property at a comparatively low price or even taking a loss (see, e.g., Battu, Ma 
and Phimister, 2008, for an analysis of housing tenure and job mobility in the UK). 
Thirdly, if immigration increases property prices it might have a detrimental impact 
on prospective first-time buyers, in particular if the housing supply is relatively 
inelastic. 
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between immigration and house prices is 
comparatively sparse and focuses largely on the US: Saiz (2003) looks at Miami after 
the Mariel Boatlift led to an influx of Cuban immigrants (see Card, 1990, for an 
analysis of the labor market consequences). His findings indicate an increase in rents, 
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in particular at the low end of the market, relative to four comparison cities by 8 to 
11% in the short run. At the same time, house prices appeared to drop – which he 
explains by an outflow of natives – and there was a short-run increase in the persons 
per bedroom. In a later study for US cities (Saiz, 2006), he finds that immigration 
shocks equal to 1% population growth increase average rents and housing values by 
approximately 1%. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find a similar result for rents (and 
wages) in 160 American cities. Finally, Saiz and Wachter (2011) find evidence for the 
US that higher immigration into areas within cities leads to lower property prices, 
partially due to a native preference for segregation, partially due to other channels 
such as segregation along socio-economic lines. Evidence from Spain (Gonzalez and 
Ortega, 2013) indicates that an average annual increase in the share of migrants by 
1.5% led to an annual increase in housing prices by 2% and to an increase by 1.2 to 
1.5% in housing units, i.e., to an increase in housing supply. Accetturo et al. (2014) 
find evidence that immigration increases prices overall, but that these effects might 
differ between city quarters. The paper that is most closely related to this one is Sá 
(2015) who also looks at the UK. She uses annual data at the level of the local 
authorities for the years 2003 to 2010 and the same methodological approach as this 
paper. Her analysis focuses on interactions between the housing and the labour 
market. In particular, her results indicate that house prices dropped, which she 
attributes primarily to native out-mobility, in particular of individuals placed 
relatively high in the wage distribution. 
 
In contrast this paper considers another mechanism through which immigration can 
affect the housing market, specifically differences in the usage of housing space and 
differences in tenure. I look at differences between the 2001 and 2011 censuses 
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(aggregated on the level of the 2001 local authorities). Like Sá (2015) I find evidence 
for native outmigration: An inflow of 100 immigrants into a local authority leads on 
average to an outflow of 34 natives. Despite the fact that this would still lead to a 
population increase, the number of property transactions appears to drop, while the 
number of properties that are available in a local authority increases. Similarly to Sá 
(2015), I also find a negative effect on property prices, in particular at the lower end 
of the property price distribution up to the median, although this finding depends to 
some extent on sample restrictions. Prices above the median appear to be unaffected. 
While these results appear to be puzzling at a first glance, they can be explained by 
findings related to property usage: First, an increase in immigration leads to an 
increase in the share of households living in more crowded conditions, i.e., a change 
in the number of people living in each available room. Secondly, we also observe a 
strong shift away from owner-occupiers to households living in (privately) rented 
properties, while the share of households in social housing remains more or less 
constant or drops. Finally, an increase in immigration leads to more households living 
in smaller properties and fewer households living in very large properties, which can 
be seen as a sign that property owners convert houses into apartments for the renting 
market. In a nutshell, even though immigration increases the population and 
consequently leads to more people needing accommodation, it also leads to a drop in 
the demand for owned properties as more people move into rented accommodation 
and existing housing is used more densely. As a result the prices for owned properties 
do not increase as well as the number of property transactions drop. 
 
Data and estimation 
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I use two main data sources: Property prices are based on data from the Land Registry 
where every property transaction in England and Wales (including its price) needs to 
be registered. For 2001, this data is available on the local authority level from 
http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/. For 2011, the raw data was obtained from the 
Land Registry at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/price-paid-data and 
aggregated at the level of the 2001 local authorities using the fact that the land 
registry data contains the exact address of each property. Data on immigration and 
housing usage comes from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. As several local authorities 
changed between 2001 and 2011, the data was obtained on the level of the local layer 
super-output areas used by the census (which are consistent over time) and then 
aggregated on the level of the 2001 local authorities.2  
 
In terms of variables, the available data contains the number the 2nd, 25th, 75th and 98th 
percentile of the property price distribution in each region and year as well as the 
median and the mean price. Looking beyond the mean price is important in this 
context for the following reasons: The house price distribution in a certain area, say a 
local authority, depends on the price per m2 of housing space and the way this 
housing space is distributed across properties. If immigrants change the way housing 
space is organized into properties, say because houses are converted into flats, you 
might see the average price per property go down even though the price per m2 of 
housing space goes up. However, in this scenario you might also see an increase at the 
                                                        
2 Lower layer super output areas (LSOAs) are spatial units used by the UK census to 
present data in a consistent way over time, while local authorities are administrative 
units that are part of the local government structure in the UK and fall between 
counties and parishes. LSOAs are relatively small spatial units: According to the 
Small Area Population Estimates by the Office for National Statistics, they have on 
average 1600 inhabitants. Local authorities are comparatively larger and usually 
encompass one larger city or larger, more rural areas. In 2001 there were 376 local 
authorities in England and Wales. 
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lower end of the property price distribution (as, say, the price for small flats goes up) 
while the top end of the property price distribution is unaffected.3 
 
I also have information on the number of property transactions in a local authority in 
each year. The census data provides information on the local (overall, migrants and 
native) population. The census also contains information on the share of households 
with 0.5 to 1 and with more than 1 person per room in their property, the share of 
household living in properties of a certain size, the overall number of properties and 
information about housing tenure. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. 
 
(Table 1 about here.) 
 
Estimation is based on the following basic estimation equation 
yit = αi + δt + τ*immigrantsit + εit,       (1) 
where i indexes regions, t years, αi is a local authority fixed effect, δt is a dummy for 
2011 and τ is identified using the variation in regional immigration from 2001 to 
2011. Standard errors are clustered on the local authority level. 
In principle, one can think of three potential measures of immigration that might be 
relevant here: Absolute increases in the number of immigrants in a region or relative 
increases in immigration, i.e., an increase in the share of immigrants in the total 
population, where population could be either the current or the 2001 population. All 
of these measures will have slightly different properties: Using absolute numbers 
                                                        
3  The idea that immigration might have different effects across an outcome 
distribution was also used by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013). However, the 
underlying mechanism in this case is very different. In Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
(2013) the different effects across the distribution effectively arise from substitution 
in the labor market, whereas in this paper they (likely) come from property owners 
splitting up properties in different ways. 
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allows immigration to have an effect on the property market through an increase in 
population, but ignores the fact that the same number of immigrants might have very 
different effects depending on the population size of the local authority. Using the 
share of immigrants in the current population takes these differences in local authority 
population size into account, but automatically controls for changes in the overall 
population. The best measure is probably the number of immigrants relative to the 
2001 population as it takes into account base differences in population size between 
local authorities, while at the same time avoiding to control for the population 
changes caused by an immigrant inflow between 2001 and 2011. In the following all 
three measures are used. In practice, the difference matters relatively little for any 
qualitative result. It is important to be clear that a one-unit increase in the immigration 
measure represents a fairly significant inflow of immigrants equal to about 1/15 of the 
existing local immigrant stock when looking at absolute numbers and about 1/9 when 
using shares. 
 
 A major concern with (1) is that the change in immigrants might be correlated with 
other (unobserved) changes on the regional level, such as economic conditions. This 
would introduce correlation between immigrantsit and εit and would bias the estimates. 
The direction of the bias is a priori unknown as immigrants could be attracted to 
“cheap” regions that experienced negative shocks to property prices (leading to a 
downward bias in τ) or to economically prosperous regions with increasing property 
prices (leading to upward bias). In addition to the local authority fixed effects, which 
take into account time-constant regional factors such as local amenities, I also add 
government region * year effects to control for wider regional trends in property 
prices, such as the fact that London has a very different price development than the 
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rest of the country, and 2001 population decile * year effects to allow for different 
developments in (initially) more and less populated areas, for example, different 
trends in urban and rural areas. 
 
Finally, this paper follows Saiz (2006), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Sá (2015) and 
Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) in using the shift-share instrument originally introduced 
by Card (2001). The instrument effectively redistributes the nationwide change in 
immigrants of a certain nationality according to the initial distribution of immigrants 
of that nationality across regions, so that a region that is initially home to, say, 5% of 
all European immigrants would receive 5% of all new European immigrants that enter 
the country during the observation period. The idea underlying this instrument is that 
new migrants are more likely to settle in regions with a substantial immigrant 
population, which leads to a correlation between the initial share of immigrants and 
changes in the share of immigrants. Immigrant nationalities can be measured 
consistently between the 2001 and 2011 on a fairly broad level, e.g., Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, Northern America, etc.  
 
To give an example on how the instrument in constructed (ignoring nationality for 
ease of exposition): The number of immigrants in the census data increased from 
4,550,799 in 2001 to 7,337,139 in 2011 (or by 2,786,340). A region that housed 1% 
of the migrants in 2001 (or 45,508) would then receive an additional influx of 
0.01*2,786,340 immigrants over the period 2001 to 2011.4 This influx is used to 
                                                        
4 A more refined version would preferably use information on nationalities on an even 
more disaggregated level as in Card (2001), Saiz (2006), Sá (2015) or Gonzalez and 
Ortega (2013). Unfortunately, disaggregated nationalities beyond broad world regions 
are not available in the published census data, which rules out this method. Note that 
not using more detailed information on nationality effectively decreases the variation 
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construct a predicted number of immigrants – in our example 45,508 + 
0.01*2,786,340 or 73371.4 – that is then used as an instrument for the (actual) 
number of immigrants (or used to construct a predicted share of immigrants that is 
then used as an instrument for the actual share). 
 
The key assumption underlying the use of this instrument is that the initial shares are 
unrelated to any future changes that might affect immigrants’ location decisions such 
as house price trends. This is generally more plausible the more time lies between the 
point in time when initial shares are measured and the point in time when the 
outcomes are measured. In this case there is unfortunately no data prior to 2001 
available, which is hardly ideal. Using immigrants separated by nationality is helpful 
in this context though as two cities with the same share of immigrants in 2001 might 
experience differential trends over time as they differ in their composition of 
immigrants and might experience different inflows of immigrants due to different 
national migration inflows from abroad.5 Finally, the various fixed effects mentioned 
earlier might also help to attenuate eventual concerns. 
 
Finally, the use of this instrument presumes that each region is too small to influence 
national trends. This might be questionable for regions with a fairly high initial share 
of the immigrant population in the UK. To attenuate these concerns I also present 
estimates where local authorities that were in the top decile in terms of their 2001 
immigrant share are excluded. This change typically does not make a great deal of 
difference to the results. 
                                                                                                                                                              
in the instrument, which would work against finding a first stage, but would not be 
expected to cause any bias in the second stage. 
5 I thank one of the reviewers for making this point. 
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 (Table 2 and figure 1 about here.) 
Table 2 presents first stage statistics for these estimates; figure 1 presents the first 
stage graphically. One can see that past migration patterns are predictive of current 
migration patterns across all specifications: Focusing on the preferred one that 
includes the various fixed effects, a 1 percentage point increase in the predicted share 
leads to a 0.47 to 0.98 percentage point increase in the observed share of migrants, 
depending on whether the current or the 2001 population is used, while an increase in 
the predicted number by 1 migrants is associated with a 0.859 increase in the 
observed number of migrants. The instrument is also fairly strong for the estimates 
using absolute numbers or immigrants relative to the 2001 population.  
 
An interesting finding from table 2 is that the effects are always smaller when using 
immigrants as a fraction of the current rather than the 2001 population. To understand 
this differences it is useful to remember how each of these are defined in detail, while 
distinguishing between immigrants who entered the country before 2001 (IE), post-
2001 immigrants (IN) and natives (N). From the perspective of 2011, the share of 
immigrants in the current population in a specific region can be expressed as 
(IN2011 + I
E
2011) / (I
N
2011 + I
E
2011  + 
N
2011)      (2) 
We can rewrite (2) in terms of stocks in 2001 and changes from 2001 to 2011: 
(IN2011 + I
E
2011) / (I
N
2011 + I
E
2001  + D.I
E
2001/11 + N2001 + D.N2001/11)   (3) 
If we instead use the 2001 population in the denominator, we get 
(IN2011 + I
E
2011) / (I
N
2011 + I
E
2001  + N2001)      (4) 
Comparing equations (3) and (4) reveals that the nominators are identical and any 
difference must be due to the denominators. The denominators in (3) and (4) differ in 
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two aspects, namely the change in pre-2001 immigrants from 2001 to 2011, 
D.IE2001/11, and the change in natives over the same period, D.N2001/11. Smaller values 
for (3) relative to (4) imply that the sum of D.IE2001/11 and D.N2001/11 is positive. 
Previous evidence on changes in the native population in response to immigration has 
been mixed: Over the same time period and for the same country Sá (2015) finds 
strong evidence of native outmigration in response to a migration inflow. Other 
evidence is more mixed: Card (2001) finds no evidence for an impact of native 
outmigration, Borjas (2006) and Saiz and Wachter (2011) find evidence for increased 
native outmigration, while Wozniak and Murray (2012) find evidence that, at least for 
some population groups, the native population increases in response to an inflow of 
immigrants. I am not aware of any evidence on the reaction of earlier immigrants to 
later inflows of immigrants. As my data does not contain the year of arrival in the UK 
for the immigrant population, I also cannot test these implications directly. 
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the basic relationship between immigration, the number of property 
sales and (log) property prices. The results clearly suggest no effect of immigration on 
property prices below and up to the median. There is some limited evidence for a 
potential price increase at the 75th percentile. Excluding the local authorities with the 
largest share of immigrants suggests a generally negative or zero impact on prices. 
The pattern of results is also relatively similar when looking at the various measures 
of immigrant inflows even though the magnitudes of these three effects are not 
directly comparable as the variables of interest differ. Depending on the sample used, 
this finding is somewhat consistent (although not fully comparable due to different 
outcomes) with Saiz (2003) who also found stronger effects for housing at the lower 
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end of the rent distribution. The fact that, if anything, more immigrants seem to lead 
to lower house prices is also consistent with the findings by Sá (2015) for the UK. 
More importantly, given the often expressed opinion that immigration is responsible 
for property price increases in the UK (see, e.g., the quote by Teresa May cited in the 
introduction), there is very little evidence that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, the 
results also suggest that the number of property transactions drops when more 
immigrants move into an area. 
 
(Table 3 about here.) 
 
One potential explanation for this finding that was also considered by Saiz (2003) or 
Sá (2015) is native outmigration: If natives try to leave the region in response to an 
increase in the number of immigrants, total population could drop leading to a 
decrease in the demand for housing. The impact of this decline in the native 
population might also depend on the economic situation of those leaving, which is 
essentially the explanation considered by Sá (2015). Another possibility is an increase 
in the supply of housing, i.e., in the number of available properties that is larger than 
the increase in demand as found by Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) for Spain.  
 
(Table 4 about here.) 
 
The evidence in table 4 suggests that the earlier result of native outmigration as in Sá 
(2015) is also found in the census data: An inflow of immigrants always leads to an 
outflow of natives, but at the same time still leads to an overall growth in the 
population. A possible caveat to note here is that natives could in principle react to 
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anticipated immigration inflows, including those based on past immigration patterns, 
which might invalidate this IV specification. Results for the overall number of 
properties in a region depend on the specification used but generally suggest either an 
increase, which might help to explain the price results, or no change in the sample 
where local authorities with high initial immigrant shares were excluded. 
 
A reason why an immigration-driven increase in the population might not necessarily 
increase the number of property transactions and ultimately house prices is the 
existence of rented housing: If immigrants are more likely to rent accommodation 
instead of immediately buying (see, e.g., Saiz, 2003, for evidence on the impact of 
immigration on rents for the US), the impact of any increase in immigration might be 
felt more strongly on the market for rented accommodation than on the property 
market. In fact it is entirely possible that the observed outflow of natives combined 
with the aforementioned tenure patterns leads to a decrease in the number of people 
seeking to buy properties and to an increase in the number of people seeking to rent. 
One should note, however, that there could well be spillovers between the markets for 
rented and bought accommodation as property-owners at some point will face the 
decision whether to live in their property, sell it or rent (parts of) it out. 
 
(Table 5 about here.) 
 
The evidence in table 5 indeed suggests that an inflow of immigrants reduces the 
share of households living as owner-occupiers and at the same time increases the 
share of households living in privately rented accommodation. Unfortunately, there 
does not appear to be data on rents or waiting lists for rented accommodation that 
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would allow an assessment on how immigration affects the price of rented housing. 
Some of the point estimates appear to be very large at a first glance. However, one 
needs to keep in mind that a one unit increase in the respective immigration measure 
represents a very large increase relative to the respective mea, which puts these 
effects into perspective. Overall, the evidence above suggests that eventual increases 
in prices might very well be found in rents rather than house prices. The evidence 
effectively also suggests that there are not yet positive spillovers from increases in 
rents to increases in house prices. 
 
Furthermore, there appears to be a drop in the share of households living in social-
rented housing. This latter result could, however, simply be due to a (relatively) fixed 
supply of social housing – meaning that the number of households in social housing 
remains constant in the face of immigration – coupled with an increase in the 
population due to immigration. Ultimately, the observed reduction in the share would 
then be due to a relatively constant numerator (the number of households in social 
housing) and an increase in the denominator (the overall number of households).  
 
A final possibility is that immigrants and natives differ in the amount of space they 
demand per person. Clearly, if immigrants are willing to accept more crowded living 
conditions, the number of people that can be housed in each property will change with 
an inflow of immigrants – in particular when accompanied by an outflow of natives.  
 
(Table 6 about here.) 
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Table 6 presents some evidence on these conjectures. The evidence suggests that an 
inflow of immigrants indeed increases the shares of household living with more 
persons per room. Across all specifications, an increase in the number of share of 
immigrants increases the share of households living with 0.5 to 1 persons per room 
and in some specifications also the share of households with more than 1 person per 
room. Table 6 also suggests that an inflow of immigrants increases the share of 
households living in properties with up to 5 rooms at the expense of the share of 
households living in larger properties. A potential explanation is that property owners 
might be converting existing larger houses into smaller units that are more easily 
offered on the renting market. 
 
Taken together, these estimates suggest that an increase in regional immigration has a 
negative effect on house prices as well as the number of property transactions in that 
region, even though it leads to population growth. These effects can be explained as, 
firstly, an increase in immigration leads to an increase in the share of households 
living in more crowded conditions, i.e., a change in the number of people living in 
each available room. Secondly, we also observe a strong shift away from owner-
occupiers to households living in (privately) rented properties, suggesting that 
immigration might put pressure on the renting market, but less on the market for 
owned properties. Finally, an increase in immigration leads to more households living 
in smaller properties and fewer households living in very large properties, which can 
be seen as a sign that property owners convert houses into apartments for the renting 
market. In short, even though immigration increases the population and consequently 
leads to more people needing accommodation, it also leads to a drop in the demand 
for owned properties as more people move into rented accommodation and existing 
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housing is used more densely. As a result the prices for owned properties as well as 
the number of property transactions drop. It is important to be clear that all of these 
mechanisms would be expected to increase the supply of housing in the long run. 
However, there has been a consistent debate in the UK for the last few years about 
housing supply not reacting sufficiently to increases in demand. The above effects 
should be seen in this light, i.e., property owners reacting to an increase in demand in 
a situation where supply only adjusts in a fairly sluggish way. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper used census data from the 2001 and 2011 UK censuses combined with 
property price data from the UK Land Registry to investigate the link between 
immigration and property prices in England and Wales with a specific focus on the 
usage of housing space and the interaction of the markets for rented and owned 
properties. Evidence from fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions suggests 
that an increase in regional immigration (a) increases the number of available 
properties, (b) decreases the number of property transactions, (c) depending on the 
specification either decreases prices at the lower end of the distribution up to the 
median or leaves them unchanged and (d) has (almost) no effect on mean property 
prices or prices above the median. I also provide evidence on mechanisms that might 
help explain these effects: (e) Natives move out of regions as immigration increases, 
even though migration still leads to population increases, (f) the number of persons 
per room increases with the share of immigrants, i.e., existing properties become 
more crowded, (g) immigration decreases the share of owner-occupiers and increases 
the share of people renting from private landlords, but not the share of people in 
social housing and (h) there appears to be a shift from larger properties towards 
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medium-sized ones, which can be a sign that owners split up larger properties such as 
houses to offer them on the renting market. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Share of migrants (actual, current 
population) 
8.9 9.0 1.1 55.0 
Share of migrants (shift-share predicted) 8.6 8.8 1.1 58.9 
Share of migrants (actual, 2001 
population) 
9.2 9.7 1.1 63.3 
Share of migrants (shift-share predicted) 8.7 9.3 1.1 64.7 
Number of migrants (actual) 15,583 25,114 72 204,640 
Number of migrants (predicted) 14,786 24,349 72 222,199 
Property price, 2nd percentile 54,001 31,689 4000 237,999 
Property price, lower quartile 105,094 57,267 16,000 485,438 
Property price, median 140,821 77,402 33,000 795,000 
Property price, upper quartile 199,711 120,324 44,975 1,600,000 
Property price, 98th percentile 491,852 419,177 97,000 5,950,000 
Property price, mean 170,701 107,049 36,673 1,340,224 
Number of property transactions 2504 1742 16 18,744 
Number of properties 62,368 40,954 1093 422,963 
Number of natives 125,503 78,341 2070 815,827 
Regional population 141,097 93,233 2153 978,987 
Share of HHs with 0.5 to 1 person per 
room 
25.7 4.4 17.0 42.9 
Share of HHs with more than 1 person per 
room 
1.6 1.6 0.4 16.0 
Share of households with (in %): 
1 room 0.7 0.9 0.0 10.1 
2 rooms 2.3 1.9 0.6 18.6 
3 rooms 8.5 4.0 3.0 31.2 
4 rooms 18.8 3.6 12.2 31.9 
5 rooms 25.8 4.4 7.8 37.6 
6 rooms 20.4 3.4 4.6 33.5 
7 rooms 10.4 2.3 2.1 15.3 
8 or more rooms 13.2 5.8 1.4 30.7 
Share of households in property, which is (in %) 
Owned 68.7 9.7 24.4 88.5 
Owned outright 32.1 6.7 7.8 48.0 
Owned with mortgage or loan 36.3 6.5 10.0 52.8 
Social rented 16.7 7.0 5.3 53.5 
Social rented, from council 9.9 7.1 0.4 42.3 
Social rented, from other 6.8 4.0 1.2 23.3 
Rented from private 12.5 5.5 3.7 40.4 
Rent free 1.8 0.8 0.7 9.7 
Observations 752 
Notes: Each observation is a local authority. All prices are in £.  
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Table 2: First stage regressions 
 Absolute 
numbers 
As share of current 
population 
As share of 2001 
population 
Local authority fixed effects and year effects 
Shift-share 
predicted 
immigrants 
1.116*** 0.859*** 1.105*** 
(0.084) (0.195) (0.080) 
First stage F-value 
(instrument) 
178.197 19.453 188.954 
Local authority fixed effects and region*year effects 
Shift-share 
predicted 
immigrants 
1.041*** 0.520** 1.065*** 
(0.133) (0.263) (0.132) 
First stage F-value 
(instrument) 
60.971 3.906 65.030 
Local authority fixed effects, region*year effects and population decile (in 2001)*year 
effects 
Shift-share 
predicted 
immigrants 
0.859*** 0.471** 0.983*** 
(0.129) (0.220) (0.136) 
First stage F-value 
(instrument) 
44.145 4.588 52.241 
Observations 752 752 752 
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. ***/**/* denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients, cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  
 24 
 
Table 3: Immigration and property prices 
 Absolute numbers 
(1000s) 
As share of current 
population (0-100) 
As share of 2001 
population (0-100) 
 Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV 
All local authorities 
Ln property prices, 2nd percentile 
Immigrants 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ln property prices, lower quartile 
Immigrants 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln property prices, median 
Immigrants 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln property prices, upper quartile 
Immigrants 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.013* 0.000 0.005** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln property prices, 98th percentile 
Immigrants -0.001 0.002 -0.007** 0.000 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
Ln property prices, mean 
Immigrants 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
# property transactions 
Immigrants -46.213*** -71.386** -47.703*** -68.532 -33.427*** -30.894 
 (14.215) (35.460) (13.141) (72.674) (10.435) (27.371) 
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Excluding local authorities with top 10% immigrant shares  
Ln property prices, 2nd percentile 
Immigrants -0.003 -0.013*** -0.005 -0.023* -0.006 -0.020** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) 
Ln property prices, lower quartile 
Immigrants -0.000 -0.005** -0.000 -0.013** -0.001 -0.008** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Ln property prices, median 
Immigrants -0.001 -0.004** -0.002 -0.010** -0.001 -0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Ln property prices, upper quartile 
Immigrants -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln property prices, 98th percentile 
Immigrants -0.003 -0.002 -0.007** -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) 
Ln property prices, mean 
Immigrants -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014* -0.001 -0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) 
# property transactions 
Immigrants -21.344** -14.778 -23.333** 28.919 -20.270** -0.252 
 (8.696) (10.578) (11.564) (35.318) (9.051) (14.831) 
Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676 
       
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. ***/**/* denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients, cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses. All estimates include a local authority-fixed effects, region*year 
effects and population decile (in 2001)*year effects. 
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Table 4: Immigration, regional population and supply of properties  
 
 Absolute numbers As share of current 
population 
As share of 2001 
population 
 Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV 
All local authorities 
Number of properties (in 1000s) 
Immigrants 0.161*** 0.237*** 0.150* 0.411* 0.147** 0.319** 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.079) (0.226) (0.061) (0.126) 
Regional population (in 1000s) 
Immigrants 0.624*** 0.591*** 0.889*** -0.490 1.144*** 1.455*** 
 (0.115) (0.208) (0.225) (1.075) (0.164) (0.252) 
Number of natives (in 1000s) 
Immigrants -0.376*** -0.409** -0.992*** -2.291*** -0.459*** -0.409* 
 (0.115) (0.208) (0.156) (0.694) (0.115) (0.231) 
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Excluding local authorities with top 10% immigrant shares 
Number of properties (in 1000s) 
Immigrants 0.117*** 0.030 0.142*** -0.004 0.099** -0.017 
 (0.044) (0.055) (0.049) (0.114) (0.039) (0.057) 
Regional population (in 1000s) 
Immigrants 0.522*** 0.606*** 0.609*** -0.663 0.716*** 0.696*** 
 (0.109) (0.136) (0.122) (0.693) (0.089) (0.156) 
Number of natives (in 1000s) 
Immigrants -0.478*** -0.394*** -0.817*** -1.516*** -0.461*** -0.456** 
 (0.109) (0.136) (0.151) (0.383) (0.127) (0.229) 
Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676 
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. ***/**/* denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients, cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses. All estimates include a local authority-fixed effects, region*year 
effects and population decile (in 2001)*year effects. 
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Table 5: Immigration and property ownership 
 
 Absolute numbers As share of current 
population 
As share of 2001 
population 
 Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV 
All local authorities 
Share of HHs in owned properties 
Immigrants -0.138*** -0.110** -0.447*** -0.451** -0.355*** -0.378*** 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.057) (0.177) (0.044) (0.079) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties 
Immigrants -0.036* -0.063*** -0.055 -0.073 -0.067** -0.139** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.041) (0.150) (0.032) (0.066) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties (council-owned) 
Immigrants -0.058* -0.047 -0.111 0.103 -0.109** -0.082 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.070) (0.243) (0.053) (0.107) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties (other) 
Immigrants 0.022 -0.016 0.055 -0.176 0.042 -0.057 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.059) (0.159) (0.046) (0.078) 
Share of HHs in private rented properties 
Immigrants 0.157*** 0.151*** 0.450*** 0.481** 0.372*** 0.440*** 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.051) (0.199) (0.038) (0.074) 
Share of HHs living rent-free 
Immigrants 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.004 0.020 0.034 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.065) (0.017) (0.031) 
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Excluding local authorities with top 10% immigrant shares 
Share of HHs in owned properties 
Immigrants -0.273*** -0.340*** -0.455*** -0.446*** -0.380*** -0.456*** 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.061) (0.145) (0.053) (0.102) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties 
Immigrants -0.038 0.042 -0.076** 0.160 -0.059* 0.053 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.038) (0.130) (0.030) (0.054) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties (council-owned) 
Immigrants -0.072 0.013 -0.121* 0.215 -0.100* 0.063 
 (0.044) (0.065) (0.070) (0.223) (0.057) (0.102) 
Share of HHs in social rented properties (other) 
Immigrants 0.034 0.029 0.045 -0.056 0.041 -0.010 
 (0.037) (0.054) (0.068) (0.149) (0.058) (0.103) 
Share of HHs in private rented properties 
Immigrants 0.278*** 0.253*** 0.468*** 0.270* 0.379*** 0.321*** 
 (0.030) (0.041) (0.054) (0.153) (0.048) (0.097) 
Share of HHs living rent-free 
Immigrants 0.003 0.018 0.017 -0.006 0.024 0.054 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.025) (0.081) (0.023) (0.049) 
Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676 
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. ***/**/* denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients, cluster-robust standard errors 
in parentheses. All estimates include a local authority-fixed effects, region*year 
effects and population decile (in 2001)*year effects. 
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Table 6: Immigration and room usage of properties 
 Absolute numbers As share of current 
population 
As share of 2001 
population 
 Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV Fixed 
effects 
IV 
All local authorities 
Share of HHs with 0.5 to 1 persons per room 
Immigrants 0.135*** 0.143*** 0.356*** 0.713*** 0.294*** 0.462*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.036) (0.153) (0.032) (0.060) 
Share of HHs with more than 1 person per room 
Immigrants 0.048*** 0.015 0.115*** -0.030 0.089*** 0.021 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.074) (0.014) (0.029) 
Share of HHs living in property up to 3 rooms 
Immigrants 0.029* -0.003 0.124*** -0.171 0.104*** 0.017 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.030) (0.187) (0.028) (0.038) 
Share of HHs living in property with 4 rooms 
Immigrants 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.102*** 0.330*** 0.074*** 0.152*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.029) (0.118) (0.021) (0.035) 
Share of HHs living in property with 5 rooms 
Immigrants -0.009 0.013 -0.016 0.321 -0.024 0.072* 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.202) (0.022) (0.037) 
Share of HHs living in property with 6 rooms 
Immigrants -0.015 -0.003 -0.080*** -0.023 -0.066*** -0.053* 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.025) (0.065) (0.020) (0.031) 
Share of HHs living in property with 7 rooms 
Immigrants -0.005 -0.018** -0.016 -0.154*** -0.016* -0.079*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.055) (0.009) (0.024) 
Share of HHs living in property with 8 or more rooms 
Immigrants -0.026*** -0.022** -0.114*** -0.303** -0.072*** -0.109*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.023) (0.125) (0.021) (0.030) 
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Excluding local authorities with top 10% immigrant shares 
Share of HHs with 0.5 to 1 persons per room 
Immigrants 0.225*** 0.309*** 0.376*** 0.687*** 0.304*** 0.499*** 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.033) (0.199) (0.037) (0.102) 
Share of HHs with more than 1 person per room 
Immigrants 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.083*** 0.060** 0.067*** 0.057*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) (0.009) (0.013) 
Share of HHs living in property up to 3 rooms 
Immigrants 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.155*** -0.100 0.144*** 0.091** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.032) (0.210) (0.029) (0.046) 
Share of HHs living in property with 4 rooms 
Immigrants 0.051** 0.092*** 0.118*** 0.365** 0.084*** 0.194*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.165) (0.031) (0.060) 
Share of HHs living in property with 5 rooms 
Immigrants -0.013 0.005 -0.002 0.303 -0.022 0.059 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.258) (0.025) (0.055) 
Share of HHs living in property with 6 rooms 
Immigrants -0.040** -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.136** -0.083*** -0.143*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.060) (0.026) (0.045) 
Share of HHs living in property with 7 rooms 
Immigrants -0.017** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.153** -0.025** -0.080** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.070) (0.011) (0.032) 
Share of HHs living in property with 8 or more rooms 
Immigrants -0.079*** -0.068*** -0.144*** -0.278* -0.097*** -0.122** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.149) (0.027) (0.050) 
Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676 
Notes: Each cell is from a separate regression. ***/**/* denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients, cluster-robust standard errors 
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in parentheses. All estimates include a local authority-fixed effects, region*year 
effects and population decile (in 2001)*year effects. 
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the first stage 
Panel (a): Immigrant share (immigrants per current population) 
 
Panel (b): Immigrant share (immigrants per 2001 population) 
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Panel (c): Number of immigrants 
 
Notes: Each circle represents one local authority. The dashed line is from a least 
squares regression. See table 2 for coefficients.  
